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Osirak II?

Bret Stephens, The Wall Street Journal, 18 settembre 2007

In the late spring of 2002 the American press reported that Israel had armed its German-made submarines with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. In Israel, this was old news. It was also headline news.

"Washington Post: Israeli subs have nuclear cruise missiles," was how the Jerusalem Post, of which I was then the editor, titled its story of June 16. It wasn't as if we didn't previously know that Israel had purchased and modified the German subs for purposes of strategic deterrence. Nor did we delight in circumlocutions. We simply needed the imprimatur of a foreign source to publish items that Israel's military censors (who operate as if the Internet doesn't exist) forbade us from reporting forthrightly.

So it's more than a little telling that the Israeli newspaper Haaretz chose, in the wake of an Israeli Air Force raid on Syria on Sept. 6 dubbed "Operation Orchard," to give front-page billing to an op-ed by John Bolton that appeared in this newspaper Aug. 31. While the article dealt mainly with the six-party talks with North Korea, Mr. Bolton also noted that "both Iran and Syria have long cooperated with North Korea on ballistic missile programs, and the prospect of cooperation on nuclear matters is not far-fetched." He went on to wonder whether Pyongyang was using its Middle Eastern allies as safe havens for its nuclear goods while it went through a U.N. inspections process.

How plausible is this scenario? The usual suspects in the nonproliferation crowd reject it as some kind of trumped-up neocon plot. Yet based on conversations with Israeli and U.S. sources, along with evidence both positive and negative (that is, what people aren't saying), it seems the likeliest suggested so far. That isn't to say, however, that plenty of gaps and question marks about the operation don't remain.

What's beyond question is that something big went down on Sept. 6. Israeli sources had been telling me for months that their air force was intensively war-gaming attack scenarios against Syria; I assumed this was in anticipation of a second round of fighting with Hezbollah. On the morning of the raid, Israeli combat brigades in the northern Golan Heights went on high alert, reinforced by elite Maglan commando units. Most telling has been Israel's blanket censorship of the story--unprecedented in the experience of even the most veteran Israeli reporters--which has also been extended to its ordinarily hypertalkative politicians. In a country of open secrets, this is, for once, a closed one.

The censorship helps dispose of at least one theory of the case. According to CNN's Christiane Amanpour, Israel's target was a cache of Iranian weapons destined for Hezbollah. But if that were the case, Israel would have every reason to advertise Damascus's ongoing violations of Lebanese sovereignty, particularly on the eve of Lebanon's crucial presidential election. Following the January 2002 Karine-A incident--in which Israeli frogmen intercepted an Iranian weapons shipment bound for Gaza--the government of Ariel Sharon wasted no time inviting reporters to inspect the captured merchandise. Had Orchard had a similar target, with similar results, it's doubtful the government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert--which badly needs to erase the blot of last year's failed war--could have resisted turning it into a propaganda coup.

Something similar goes for another theory, this one from British journalist Peter Beaumont of the Observer, that the raid was in fact "a dry run for attack on Iran." Mr. Beaumont is much taken by a report that at least one of the Israeli bombers involved in the raid dropped its fuel tanks in a Turkish field near the Syrian border.

Why Israel apparently chose to route its attack through Turkey is a nice question, given that it means a detour of more than 1,000 miles. Damascus claims the fuel tank was discarded after the planes came under Syrian anti-aircraft fire, which could be true. But if Israel is contemplating an attack on Tehran's nuclear installations--and it is--it makes no sense to advertise the "Turkish corridor" as its likely avenue of attack.

As for the North Korean theory, evidence for it starts with Pyongyang. The raid, said one North Korean foreign ministry official quoted by China's Xinhua news agency, was "little short of wantonly violating the sovereignty of Syria and seriously harassing the regional peace and security." But who asked him, anyway? In August, the North Korean trade minister signed an agreement with Syria on "cooperation in trade and science and technology." Last week, Andrew Semmel, the acting counterproliferation chief at the State Department, confirmed that North Korean technicians of some kind were known to be in Syria, and that Syria was "on the U.S. nuclear watch list." And then there is yesterday's curious news that North Korea has abruptly suspended its participation in the six-party talks, for reasons undeclared.

That still leaves the question of just what kind of transfers could have taken place. There has been some speculation regarding a Syrian plant in the city of Homs, built 20 years ago to extract uranium from phosphate (of which Syria has an ample supply). Yet Homs is 200 miles west of Dayr az Zawr, the city on the Euphrates reportedly closest to the site of the attack. More to the point, uranium extraction from phosphates is a commonplace activity (without it, phosphate is hazardous as fertilizer) and there is a vast gulf separating this kind of extraction from the enrichment process needed to turn uranium into something genuinely threatening.

There is also a rumor--sourced to an unnamed expert in the Washington Post--that on Sept. 3 a North Korean ship delivered some kind of nuclear cargo to the Syrian port of Tartus, forcing the Israelis to act. That may well be accurate, though it squares awkwardly with the evidence that plans for Orchard were laid months ago.

More questions will no doubt be raised about the operational details of the raid (some sources claim there were actually two raids, one of them diversionary), as well as fresh theories about what the Israelis were after and whether they got it. The only people that can provide real answers are in Jerusalem and Damascus, and for the most part they are preserving an abnormal silence. In the Middle East, that only happens when the interests of prudence and the demands of shame happen to coincide. Could we have just lived through a partial reprise of the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor? On current evidence, it is the least unlikely possibility.

Syria blast 'linked to chemical weapons': report

AFP, 19 settembre 2007

LONDON (AFP) — Iranian engineers were among those killed in a blast at a secret Syrian military installation two months ago, defence group Jane's said Wednesday after claiming that the base was being used to develop chemical weapons.

The July 26 explosion in Aleppo, northern Syria, was reported at the time. The official Sana news agency said 15 Syrian military personnel were killed and 50 people were injured, most of them slightly from flying glass. The agency said only that "very explosive products" blew up after fire broke out at the facility and that the blaze was not an act of sabotage. But in the September 26 edition of Jane's Defence Weekly, Syrian defence sources were quoted as saying the explosion happened during tests to weaponise a Scud C missile with mustard gas, which is banned under international law.

Fuel caught fire in a missile production laboratory and "dispersed chemical agents (including VX and Sarin nerve agents and mustard blister agent) across the storage facility and outside. "Other Iranian engineers were seriously injured with chemical burns to exposed body parts not protected by safety overalls," the publication quoted the sources as saying. Among the dead were "dozens" of Iranian missile weaponisation engineers, it added.

The claims come as North Korea denied reports it was helping Syria develop nuclear weapons and intense speculation that a recent Israeli air raid on Syria may have targeted a joint nuclear project. Jane's said the regime in Damascus has since imposed a media black-out on the blast and had "destroyed" evidence that base was being used as a missile production site with Iranian help. It also questioned the government's claim that the explosion occurred because of a sudden rise in the ambient air temperature that caused a chemical reaction of sensitive and highly volatile substances. One of its sources described the explanation as "implausible" because the blast happened at about 4:30 am, two hours before sunrise when temperatures were cool. The article also quoted Syrian opposition sources as noting that vehicles destined for car bomb attacks in Iraq are prepared at the same facility under the supervision of Syrian intelligence and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

Jane's assessed that the incident confirmed information that the two countries have been involved in developing chemical weapons for more than two years under a strategic co-operation agreement. It said Iran helped Syria in the planning, establishment and management of five facilities designed to develop chemical weapons on an industrial scale. An Iranian chemical manufacturer, whose identity Jane's said it knows and with connections to the Islamic republic's defence industry, and a Syrian firm with links to the military have made a number of deals since 2004.

One of Jane's sources said they involved the importation of "hundreds of tonnes of sodium sulphide, hydrochloric acid and ethylene glycol-MEG from Iran" which can be used to produce mustard gas and Sarin.

Bashar's Bad Judgment

David Schenker, Weekly Standard, 19 settembre 2007

ON SEPTEMBER 6, Israeli planes bombed a presumed North Korean-supplied Syrian nuclear weapons facility. The incident highlights an ongoing theme in regional politics in recent years: Syrian President Bashar Asad's profoundly poor judgment.

Policies pursued by the Asad regime, particularly since 2003--from Iraq, to Lebanon, to the Palestinian Authority--have been highly provocative. Syria under Bashar has actively worked to undermine stability in four of five neighboring countries. And now, revelations about the Syrian nuclear program threaten to ignite a war with Israel.

The Syrian president's judgment issues are not particularly surprising. After all, Bashar was never intended to rule Syria. His father, longtime Syrian dictator Hafiz Asad, only chose him following the death of Bashar's older brother Basil. Ill-prepared for the job, Bashar was hastily trained. He joined the Syrian army in 1994 and was awarded the rank of Colonel in just 5 years--an achievement that usually takes 20. When he eventually succeeded his father Hafiz in 2000, the title "president for life" conferred neither his father's experience nor his judgment.

In just seven years in power, Bashar has provoked the enmity of all of Syria's neighbors, save Islamist-led Turkey, as well as much of Europe and the United States. This dubious accomplishment was largely achieved due to gratuitous policies like providing Saddam with military materiel on the eve of the U.S. invasion. Bashar also managed to alienate longtime friend Saudi Arabia. Earlier this month, the Saudis evacuated their ambassador to Beirut after learning of a Syrian-directed assassination plot.

Thanks to Bashar, the Asad regime, which comfortably dominated Syria for 30 years, also faces an existential threat from the United Nations-mandated international court prosecuting the murderers of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri. UN investigators have already hinted that senior officials in Bashar's regime will be implicated in the crime. This development could shake the foundations of the regime.

While Bashar and his ruling Alawite clique retain hold on power, Syria's regional and international position has declined dramatically under his leadership. This has occurred not because Bashar departed from the problematic policies of his father, but rather, because these policies have been pursued without regard to changing regional and international dynamics. Hafiz Asad was no panacea, but he was cautious. His son Bashar is reckless.

The most pronounced change concerns Syria's relationship with Iran. An Arab Nationalist, Hafiz nevertheless allied with (Persian) Tehran, but relied on the former Soviet Union as his military patron. Since assuming power, Bashar has enhanced relations with Iran, particularly in the military sphere. Not only has Tehran reportedly absorbed much of Damascus' debt to Russia, Iranian Revolutionary Guards are said to be stationed in Syria providing training. Bashar's Syria has become a client to the Iranian patron.

Under Hafiz, Syria quietly supported Hamas, providing safehaven to the Palestinian terrorist group. Bashar improved these ties, as well, discarding the longstanding fiction that Hamas' Damascus offices were merely "information" offices. In 2006, in an unprecedented development, Syria allowed Hamas leaders to claim responsibility for the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit from the group's Damascus office. The next week, Israel sent planes to buzz Bashar's summer palace in Latakia.

Syria's relations with Hezbollah have transformed too. Hafiz Asad saw Hezbollah as a cudgel to wield against Israel and seldom met with Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Bashar seems to harbor a genuine admiration for the "resistance" organization, meeting with Nasrallah on nearly a dozen occasions. This shift in perception has translated to a closer operational relationship. Syria had always served as a key node for the transshipment of weapons from Iran to Hezbollah. Now, under Bashar, Syria provides its own top-shelf Russian made and locally produced weapons to the Shiite terrorist organization, inviting Israeli direct action.

And finally, there is the relationship with North Korea. Syria had been trucking with North Korea for some time, receiving technical assistance from Pyongyang on its missile and chemical weapons programs, drawing little international attention or sanction. But as with Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iraq, Bashar apparently went too far.

Although an armistice was signed in 1974, Syria and Israel technically remain at war. For decades, Syria has continued the war against Israel via proxies. Despite this, the disputed territory of the Golan--which Israel occupied in 1967 and annexed in 1981--continues to be Israel's quietest border. All this could change, however, if the Asad regime feels compelled to respond militarily, either out of pride or to silence its critics.

No doubt, the Israeli attack was an embarrassment to the Asad regime. Now Syrian officials are ominously warning that they will "choose the place and the hour" of their response. Should Bashar decide to retaliate, the consequences will be disastrous for Syria. Hoping to salvage North Korean talks and a moribund Middle East peace process, Washington is hoping that Damascus will shun reprisals and downplay the incident. Regrettably, given his penchant for bad judgment, odds are high that Bashar will make yet another poor choice.

David Schenker is a senior fellow in Arab politics at The Washington Institute. From 2002 to 2006, he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as country director for Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories.

Il gas nervino di Iran e Siria

Il Foglio, 20 settembre 2007

Roma. “Abbiamo ristabilito la deterrenza nei confronti della Siria e dell’Iran”: con questa frase Amos Yadin, capo dei servizi segreti militari di Israele, ha spiegato alla Knesset il senso dell’ultima scossa impressa da Israele agli equilibri mediorientali. Una frase un poco criptica, che però ha in sè anche la spiegazione della ridda di dichiarazioni e smentite che occupano i giornali in questi giorni. Il senso delle parole di Amos Yadin è tutto riassunto in alcuni fatti. Il primo: la Siria, che ha rinnovato il 21 luglio scorso a Damasco il patto militare che lega il presidente siriano Beshar al Assad a quello iraniano Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, sta tentando di dotarsi di armamento nucleare comprato dalla Corea del nord e di installarlo su uno dei suoi 60 Scud-C. Sta anche tentando di dotarsi di armi chimiche letali a lunga gettata, come dimostra l’esplosione del 23 luglio scorso – rivelata lunedì dalla rivista militare Jane’s Defense – in cui dozzine di ufficiali iraniani e 15 ufficiali siriani sono morti mentre tentavano di armare alcuni Scud-C con gas nervino in una base di Aleppo. minacciose dichiarazioni di ieri di Mohammed Alavi vicecomandante dell’aviazione dell’Iran: “Abbiamo un piano che prevede, nel caso di un eventuale attacco di pazzia del governo israeliano, che i cacciabombardieri iraniani colpiscano per rappresaglia il territorio israeliano: la gittata dei nostri missili copre l’intero territorio di quel regime. Questo piano non e una vana minaccia, Israele dovrebbe togliersi dalla testa ogni follia”.

In questo contesto di deterrenza riequilibrata, vanno infine collocate le dichiarazioni di Simon Peres che martedì ha affermato: “Il nervosismo nelle relazioni tra noi e la

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