12 settembre 2007

Autore: Orma

Il gen. petraeus e l'ambasciatore crocker al congresso degli stati uniti:

1. Report to congress on the situation in iraq: "prepared statement" per il congresso by gen. petraeus

2. Statement of ambassador ryan c. crocker, u.s. ambassador to the republic of iraq: documento dell'ambasciatore crocker per il congresso

3. Audizione di crocker e petraeus allla commissione armed services del senato, 11 settembre '07 (trascrizione integrale)

4. Le slide di petraeus

UNITED STATES SENATE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

_________________________________________________

There will be a meeting of the Committee on

ARMED SERVICES

Tuesday, September 11, 2007 2:00 PM Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building OPEN

To receive testimony on the situation in Iraq and progress made by
the Government of Iraq in meeting benchmarks.

Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker
United States Ambassador to Iraq

General David H. Petraeus, USA
Commanding General
Multi-National Force - Iraq

Le slide di Petraeus

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Parla Petraeus: estratto dall'audizione al senato dell'11 settembre

da: washington post, Crocker, Petraeus Testify Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Iraq, September 11, 2007

(...)

SEN. CARL LEVIN, D-MICH. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Senator McCain.

Again, our welcome to both of you, our thanks to both of you and to your families, that provide essential support for you in the extraordinarily difficult circumstances in which you both work.

We're indebted to you for your appearance here today and for the fact that this is the third of three long hearings for you.

General Petraeus?

PETRAEUS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator McCain, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq.

SEN. CARL LEVIN, D-MICH. CHAIRMAN : May I interrupt you for one moment?

PETRAEUS: Yes, sir.

LEVIN: If you choose, both of you or each of you may reduce and summarize, if you so choose.

Because of the fact that your statements have been given in full before the other committees, I'm not asking you to do that. We leave that up to you.

PETRAEUS: Mr. Chairman, I've actually -- I've cut it down a bit.

LEVIN: All right.

(LAUGHTER)

PETRAEUS: It didn't take much suggesting, then, to do that. But it's still...

LEVIN: That's fine. Do it as you wish.

PETRAEUS: Thank you for the opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command for the way forward.

As I stated in testimony to the two House committees yesterday and to the Foreign Relations Committee this morning, this is my testimony. Although I have briefed my assessment and the recommendations in it to my chain of command, I wrote this statement myself and did not clear it with anyone in the Pentagon, the White House, or Congress.

Today, I will provide a summary of the full written testimony I have provided to each of you and for the record.

As a bottom line upfront, the military objectives of the surge are in large measure being met. In recent months, in the face of tough enemies and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, coalition and Iraqi security forces have achieved progress in the security arena.

Though improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents has declined in eight of the past 12 weeks. During this time, ethno-sectarian violence has also been reduced and the number of overall civilian deaths has declined, though both are clearly still at troubling levels.

The progress is a result of many factors. Coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt significant blows to Al Qaida-Iraq and have disrupted Shia militia extremists. Additionally, in a very significant development, we and our Iraqi partners are being assisted by tribes and local citizens who are rejecting extremism and choosing to help secure Iraq.

Iraqi security forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder more of the load, albeit slowly, and amid continuing concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in their ranks.

Based on all this and the further progress we believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer. Withdrawing one quarter of our combat brigades by that time without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve.

Beyond that, while noting the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult, and sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe that it is possible for us to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time, though doing so will be neither quick nor easy.

Having provided that a summary, I would like to review the nature of the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation before the surge, describe the current situation, and explain the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command.

The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian committees for power and resources. This competition will take place. The question is whether it is resolved more or less violently.

This chart shows the security challenges in Iraq. Foreign, and home-grown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists and criminals all pushed the ethno-sectarian competition elements toward violence. Maligned actions by Syria and, especially by Iran fuel that violence. And lack of adequate governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust and various forms of corruption add to the challenges.

In January 2007, in response to the horrific ethno-sectarian violence that spiraled out of control in 2006, and to an assessment in December 2006, that we were failing to achieve our objectives, a surge of forces began flowing into Iraq focusing on protecting the population and reducing sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad.

In so doing, these forces have employed counterinsurgency practices, such as living among the people they are securing. In mid-June, with all the surge brigades in place, we launched a series of offensive operations in partnership with Iraqi security forces.

These operations focused on expanding the gains achieved in the preceding months in Anbar province, pursuing Al Qaida in the Diyala river valley and several other areas, and clearing Baqouba, several key Baghdad neighborhoods, the remaining sanctuaries in Anbar province and important areas around Baghdad.

And with coalition and Iraqi forces located among the populations they are securing, we have sought to keep areas clear and to help Iraqis in rebuilding them.

All the while we have engaged in dialogue with insurgent groups and tribes leading to additional elements standing up to oppose Al Qaida and other extremists.

The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi counterparts has, as I noted at the outset, been substantial. While there have been setbacks as well as successes and tough losses along the way, overall our tactical commanders see improvements in the security environment.

We do not, however, just rely on gut feel or personal observations. To gauge progress and determine trends, we also conduct rigorous and consistent data collection and analysis. In fact, two U.S. intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology and concluded that the data we produce is the most accurate and authoritative in Iraq.

As I mentioned up front, and as the chart before you reflects, the level of security incidents has decreased significantly since the start of the surge of offensive operations in mid-June, declining in eight of the past 12 weeks, with the level of incidents in the past two weeks the lowest since June 2006.

Civilian deaths, of all categories, less natural causes, have also declined, considerably, by over 45 percent, Iraq-wide, since the height of sectarian violence in December. This is shown by the top line on this next chart. And the decline by some 70 percent in Baghdad is shown in the bottom line.

Periodic mass-casualty attacks, car bombs by Al Qaida, have tragically added to the numbers outside Baghdad, in particular. Even without the sensational attacks, however, the level of civilian deaths is of serious concern.

As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths, an important subset of the overall civilian casualty figures, has also declined significantly since the height of the sectarian violence in December. Iraq-wide, as shown by the top line on this chart, ethno- sectarian deaths have come down by over 55 percent.

In Baghdad, as the bottom lines show, ethno-sectarian deaths have declined by some 80 percent since December. This chart also displays the density of sectarian incidents in various Baghdad neighborhoods, and it both reflects the progress made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence and identifies the area where more work must be done.

As we have gone on the offensive in former Al Qaida and insurgent sanctuaries, and as locals have increasingly supported our efforts, we have found a substantially increased number of arms, ammunition and explosive caches.

As this next chart shows, we have so far this year already found and cleared over 4,400 caches, nearly 1,700 more than we discovered in all of last year.

This may, in fact, be a factor in the reduction in the number of overall improvised explosive device attacks in recent months which, as this next chart shows, has declined sharply, by about one-third since June.

The change in the security situation in Anbar province has, of course, been particularly dramatic. As the next chart shows, monthly attack levels in Anbar have declined from some 1,350 in October 2006 to a bit over 200 in August of this year.

This dramatic decrease reflects the significance of the local rejection of Al Qaida and the new-found willingness of local Anbaris to volunteer to serve in the Iraqi army and Iraqi police service.

To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across Iraq, as is shown by this next chart depicting violence trends in several key Iraqi provinces. The trend in Nineveh province in northern Iraq, for example, has been much more up and down, until a recent decline.

And the same is true in Salahuddin province, also north of Baghdad and the site of Saddam's former hometown, though recent trends there and in Baghdad have been the right direction.

In any event, the overall trajectory in Iraq, a steady decline of incidents in the past three months, is still quite significant.

The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also declined in each of the past five months -- the total from a high of some 175 in March as this next chart shows to about 90 this past month.

While the trend has been heartening, the number of high-profile attacks is still too high, and we continue to work hard to destroy the networks that carry out these barbaric attacks.

Our operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress against Al Qaida-Iraq. As this next chart shows, in the past eight months, we have considerably reduced the areas in which Al Qaida enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutralized five media cells, detained the senior Iraqi leader of Al Qaida-Iraq, and killed or captured nearly 100 other key leaders and some 2,500 rank-and-file fighters.

Al Qaida is certainly not defeated. However, it is off balance and we are pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively. Of note these gains against Al Qaida are a result of the synergy of actions by conventional forces, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, and special operations elements.

A combination of these assets is necessary to conduct effective operations against terrorist elements.

In the past six months, we have also targeted Shia militia extremists, killing or capturing over 1,400 senior leaders and fighters. It is increasingly apparent, to both coalition and Iraqi leaders, that Iran -- through the use of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Quds Force -- seeks to turn these Shia militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve it's interest and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.

The most significant development in the past six months likely has been the increasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting Al Qaida and other extremists. The success in Anbar is an example of what can happen when local Iraqis decide to oppose Al Qaida and reject its Taliban-like ideology.

While Anbar's model cannot be replicated everywhere in Iraq, it does demonstrate the dramatic change in security that is possible with the support and participation of local citizens.

As the next chart shows, other tribes have been inspired by the actions of those in Anbar and have volunteered to fight extremists, as well.

Over 20,000 such individuals are already being hired for the Iraqi police. Thousands of others are being assimilated into the Iraqi army. And thousands more are vying for a spot in Iraq's security forces.

As I noted earlier, Iraqi security forces have continued to grow, to develop their capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burden of providing security for their country.

Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics and supporting institutions and an insufficient number of qualified commissioned and noncommissioned officers, Iraqi units are engaged around the country.

As this next chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi army, national police and special operations forces battalions in the fight -- with about 95 of those capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support.

Although, their qualitative development has not always kept pace with their quantitative growth, all of Iraq's battalions have been heavily involved in combat operations that often result in a lost of leaders, soldiers and equipment. Despite the losses, a number of Iraqi units across Iraq now operate with minimal coalition assistance.

In order to take over the security of their country, the Iraqis are rapidly expanding their security forces. In fact, they have some 445,000 assigned to the Ministries of Interior and Defense now and we believe they will be close to 480,000 by year's end.

Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend more on it's security forces than it will receive in security assistance from the United States. In fact, Iraq is becoming one of the United States' larger foreign military sales customers; committing some $1.6 billion to FMS already with the possibility of up to $1.8 billion being committed before the end of the year.

And here I'd like to say that I appreciate the attention that the chairman and other members of this committee have recently given to speeding up the FMS process for Iraq.

To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving and Iraqi elements are slowly taking on more of the responsibility for protecting their citizens. Innumerable challenges lie ahead. However, coalition and Iraqi security forces have made progress toward achieving sustainable security. As a result, the United States will be in a position to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead.

Two weeks ago, I provided recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq to the members of my chain of command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The essence of the approach I recommended is captured in its title: Security While Transitioning, From Leading to Partnering to Overwatch.

This approach seeks to build on the security improvements our troopers and our Iraqi counterparts have achieved in recent months. It reflects recognition of the importance of securing the population and the imperative of transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi institutions and Iraqi forces as quickly as possible, but without rushing to failure.

It includes substantial support for the continuing development of Iraqi security forces. It also stresses the need to continue the counterinsurgency strategy that we have been employing, but with Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the load.

And it highlights the importance of regional and global diplomatic approaches.

Finally, in recognition of the fact that this war is not only being fought on the ground in Iraq, but also in cyberspace, it also notes the need to contest the enemy's growing use of that important medium to spread extremism.

The recommendations I have provided were informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that military aspects of the surge have achieved progress and generated momentum. Iraqi security forces have been slowly shouldering more of the security burden in Iraq. A mission focus on either population security or transition alone will not be adequate to achieve our objectives.

Success against Al Qaida Iraq and Iranian-supported militia extremists requires conventional forces as well as special operations forces. And the security in local political situations will enable us to draw down the surge forces.

My recommendations also took into account a number of strategic considerations -- that political progress will only take place if sufficient security exists.

Long-term U.S. ground force viability will benefit from force reductions as the surge runs its course.

Regional, global and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success. And Iraqi leaders, understandably, want to assume greater sovereignty in their country, although, as they recently announced, they do desire a continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq in 2008 under a new U.N. Security Council Resolution. And, following that, they want to negotiate a long-term security agreement with United States and other nations.

Based on these considerations and having worked the battlefield geometry with Lieutenant General Ray Odierno to ensure that we retain and build on the gains for which our troopers have fought. I have recommended a draw down of the surge forces from Iraq. In fact, later this month, the Marine expeditionary deployed as part of the surge will depart Iraq.

Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved, this will be followed by the withdrawal of a brigade combat team without replacement in mid-December, and the further redeployment without replacement of four other brigade combat teams and the two surge Marine battalions in the first months of 2008, until we reach the pre- surge level of 15 brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008.

Force reductions will continue beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008. In my professional judgment, however, it would be premature to make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time.

In fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous. In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008, until about mid-March of next year.

We will, no later than that time, consider factors similar to those on which I based the current recommendations. Having by then, of course, a better feel for the security situation, the improvements and the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation.

This final chart captures the recommendations I have described, showing the recommended reduction of brigade combat teams as the surge runs its course, and illustrating the concept of our units adjusting their missions and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqis as the situation in Iraqi capabilities permit.

It also reflects the no-later-than-date for recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer, and it provides a possible approach we have considered for the future force-structure and mission set in Iraq over time.

In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note, again, that, like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq's problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions. And though we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a premature draw down of forces would likely have devastating consequences.

That assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August Defense Intelligence Agency report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.

Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results, including the high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi security forces, rapid deterioration of local security initiatives, Al Qaida-Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver, a marked increase violence and further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows, alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain advantage over their rivals, and exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran.

Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment and believe that the best way to secure our national interests and avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our operations on securing the Iraqi people while targeting terrorist groups and militia extremists and, as quickly as conditions are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements.

Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for your support of our men and women in uniform in Iraq. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coastguardsmen with whom I'm honored to serve are the best equipped and very likely the most professional force in our nation's history.

All of us appreciate what you have done to ensure that these great troopers have had what they have needed to accomplish their mission, just as we appreciate what you have done to take care of their families, as they, too, have made significant sacrifices in recent years.

The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and individual equipment, ammunitions, and command, control and communication systems, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and vehicles and counter IED systems and programs, and in manned and unmanned aircraft have proven invaluable in Iraq.

Additionally, your funding of the Commanders Emergency Response program has given our leaders a critical tool with which to prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign.

Finally, we appreciate as well your funding of our new detention programs and rule of law initiatives in Iraq.

In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier again in Iraq with America's new greatest generation. Our country's men and women in uniform have done a magnificent job in the most complex and challenging environment imaginable. All Americans should be very proud of their sons and daughters serving in Iraq today.

(...)

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12 settembre 2007

UNITED STATES SENATE

ARMED SERVICES

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